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RECENT CASES
of whether state action is involved becomes a very close and crucial
delineation. Federal Housing Administration home loans, urban re-
newal, the licensing of real estate agents by the state, building codes,
and zoning ordinances are but a few facets of public dominion in the
field of housing alone. The using of state action as the ultimate test is
becoming, at the least, somewhat tenuous, since it is possible to find
state action in a case such as this by seizing on the licensing aspect
only. By balancing the interests involved, the court determines
whether there is or is not state action to the extent thus far determined
by the Supreme Court as being in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment and reaches a desired result.
Donald S. Muir
CanumAL PRocEDun - EvmENcE - Wu=APPnG - ADmissmILrrY N
STATE CouRTs.-Defendant's conversation with the prosecuting witness
was recorded by an officer who attached a tape recorder microphone
to the witness' telephone receiver. The recording was made with the
aid and consent of the prosecuting witness, but without the knowledge
of the defendant. In a criminal action for obtaining money under false
pretenses, the trial court refused to allow the introduction of this
recording as evidence. The Commonwealth appealed to the court of
appeals, seeking a certification of law on the issue of admissibility.
Held: The recording is admissible. The recording of the conversation
is not a violation of the federal statutory prohibition of wiretapping,
and the federal rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of a
federal statute does not apply to the states. Commonwealth v.
Brinkley, 362 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1962).
As early as 1914, the United States Supreme Court held, in Weeks
v. United States,' that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure was not admissible in a federal court. The court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would defeat the fourth amendment's protec-
tion against such searches and seizures. But in the case of Olmstead
v. United States,2 the Supreme court refused to apply this doctrine to
a victim of wiretapping, holding that wiretapping is not an illegal
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In
response to this case, Congress enacted the Federal Communications
Act, which provides that no person shall intercept and divulge any
communication without the consent of the sender.3 Since the enact-
1232 U.S. 883 (1914).
2277 U.S. 438 (1928).
847 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
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ment of this statute, evidence obtained in violation of its provisions has
been held inadmissible in federal courts.
4
As the wording of the statute indicates, there must be an intercep-
tion and divulgence of the communication to violate the provision.
The divulgence requirement is satisfied by an attempt to introduce
the communication into evidence at a trial. Needless to say, this
requirement was satisfied in the Brinkley case. The Kentucky court,
however, could not find an interception of the communication. In
United States v. Polakoff,5 Judge Learned Hand elaborated on the
interception requirement:
The statute [Federal Communication Act] does not speak of physical
interruption of the circuit, or of 'taps'; it speaks of 'interceptions' and
anyone intercepts a message to whose intervention as a listener the
communicants do not consent; the means he employs can have no im-
portance; it is the breach of privacy that counts.6
Despite the logic of Judge Hand's analysis, the Supreme Court
rejected it two years later in Goldman v. United States,7 and held
that the statute was intended to protect the means of communication
rather than the secrecy of the conversation. In so doing, the Court
defined interception to mean: "... [T] he taking or seizure by the way
or before arrival at the destined place."8 This definition would seem
to require that the flow of transmission be diverted by a physical
interruption of the circuit. Under these principles, the attachment of
the microphone to the telephone receiver in the Brinkley case was not
an interception within the meaning of the statute.
The second issue considered in the Brinkley case was whether the
federal rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of a federal
statute was binding on state courts. At common law, the fact that
evidence was illegally obtained did not operate to exclude it, since the
manner of its seizure was considered to be a collateral issue and not
to be gone into at the trial. The Weeks decision, however, altered this
rule and was later extended to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of federal statutes.9 In Wolf v. Colorado,10 the Supreme Court spe-
cifically held that the fourteenth amendment did not require state
courts to exclude evidence obtained in a manner violating the fourth
amendment. This case, however, was recently overruled by Mapp v.
4Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937).
5 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940).
61d. at 889.
7316 U.S. 129 (1942).
81d. at 134.
9 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
30 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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Ohio,11 a landmark ruling, in which the court stated: "We hold that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Con-
stitution, is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." 2
This case has definitely extended the exclusionary rule to state courts
when the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the fourth
amendment has been breached.
It is too early to determine whether the Mapp case was intended
to impose upon state courts the federal rule excluding evidence
obtained in violation of federal statutes. In an earlier case, Schwartz v.
Texas,'3 the Court held that state courts were free to admit wiretap
evidence, even though obtained in violation of the Federal Com-
munications Act. Since the Schwartz case was based partly on the
Wolf case, uncertainty again prevails as to admissibility of wiretap
evidence in state courts. One federal court has refused to extend the
Mapp rule to evidence gained in violation of a federal statute without
affirmative action by the Supreme Court.14 The court of appeals, in
the Brinkley case, accepted the reasoning of this federal court.
Opponents of wiretapping have two possible constitutional grounds
on which to exclude wiretap evidence. The more direct approach is to
ask for the overruling of the Olmstead case and thus make wiretapping
an unconstitutional search and seizure within the fourth amendment.
Presently, the Olmstead case is the only bar to a ruling that wiretap
evidence is inadmissible in any court. If this case were overruled and
wiretapping found to be within the fourth amendment, then the Mapp
case would render any evidence obtained thereby inadmissible in state
courts due to the violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Olmstead case was decided by a five to four vote in
1928. Vigorous dissents were voiced by Brandeis and Holmes. 15 The
Court has had no occasion to make a direct ruling on the correctness
of this holding because the passage of the Federal Communications
Act obviated the problem. Prior to the Mapp case, there was no
reason to reconsider the holding due to the statute and the Wolf case.
The alternative method is to argue that the Mapp case and Benanti
v. United States16 have overruled the Schwartz case sub silento. This
approach would conclude that evidence gained in a manner violating
a federal statute would be inadmissible because of the same due
process clause.
11367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12 Id. at 655.
13 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
14 Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961).
15 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 471 (1928).
16355 U.S. 96 (1957). The court held evidence obtained by state officers
through wiretapping authorized by state statutes was inadmissible in federal court.
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals took an altogether contrary view
in the principle case. To interpret the court's ruling as holding
wiretap evidence admissible in Kentucky, however, does not neces-
sarily follow. The attachment of the microphone to the telephone was
held not to be a wiretap within the meaning of Federal Communica-
tions Act. Even though the federal rule of evidence does not operate
mandatorily on the states, the court may well disallow evidence gained
by a true wiretap.
In the past, the court of appeals, in its judicial discretion, has
excluded evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.17 The
court was not at the time bound to do so by rulings of the Supreme
Court. The same policy considerations seem present where there has
been a violation of a federal statute.
George W. Mills
ComImmcLA. LAw-PmvrrY OF CoNTRAcr NECESSARY FOR ImpLiD
WAmrANT.-The plaintiff, a citizen of Kentucky, purchased a re-
frigerator compressor unit from a Kentucky retailer and installed it in
a supermarket that same day. The next day, when the plaintiff
removed his test gauges from the unit, it exploded, causing the plain-
tiff personal injuries. The explosion was attributed to the presence
of defective casting. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the unit,
a Michigan corporation, in federal district court in Michigan to
recover damages for personal injuries. The jury, having been in-
structed to consider two theories, negligence in manufacture and
breach of implied warranty, returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Held:
Reversed and new trial ordered.1 It was error to submit the case to
the jury under the theory of implied warranty. Being a diversity case,
Kentucky law is applicable. Under Kentucky law the absence of
privity between the plaintiff and the manufacturer precludes the
plaintiff from recovering from the manufacturer for breach of implied
warranty. Schultz v. Tecumseh Products, 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962).
The prevailing rule is that "privity of contract" is an essential ele-
ment for recovery on the implied warranty theory.2 Privity of contract
is required even though the action for breach of warranty was
17 Bengi v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1959).
1 The court reversed on the ground that if a case is submitted to a jury on
more than one theory of recovery and reversible error is committed in the sub-
mission of one of these theories, a general verdict returned in favor of the
plaintiff must be set aside.2 Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 46 (1960).
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